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In 1908, Congress authorized payments to local governments, including counties and school districts, 
to compensate for the non-taxable status of the newly established forest reserves within their bound-
aries. The original program shared revenue generated from commercial activities on public lands, 
e.g. timber harvesting, not anticipating the major changes in the volume and types of activities on 
National Forest lands, particularly in the Pacific Northwest, that have played out over the past cen-
tury. Two subsequent reforms – the appropriated Payments in Lieu of Taxes (PILT) in 1976 and 
‘transition’ payments made between 1990 and 2018, including payments associated with the North-
west Forest Plan and the Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination Act (SRS) – have 
yet to deliver a permanent or effective policy solution that matches county payments to local govern-
ments’ economic needs or forest management objectives. This paper analyzes three policy options: a 
status quo option of PILT and revenue sharing payments; reauthorization of SRS; and the creation of 
a new permanent trust fund at the federal level. The paper concludes that the trust option (‘County 
Payments 4.0’) could resolve key challenges by stabilizing and growing revenue over time, eliminat-
ing the need for cycles of conditional appropriations, and providing flexibility to address economic 
and forest management needs in public land counties. 
 
Keywords: Payments in Lieu of Taxes (PILT), Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-
Determination Act (SRS), natural resources, rural economic development, local government 
fiscal policy
 
n 1908, Congress authorized 
‘county payments’ to local gov-
ernments, including counties and 
school districts, to compensate for 
the non-taxable status of the 
newly-established forest reserves 
within their boundaries. This original pro-
gram based payment levels on commercial 
activities on public lands, e.g. timber harvest-
ing, not anticipating the major changes in the 
volume and types of activities on National 
Forest lands that have played out over the 
past century, particularly in the Pacific 
Northwest region. Two subsequent re-
forms—the permanently-authorized Pay-
ments in Lieu of Taxes (PILT) in 1976 and 
‘transition’ payments beginning in the 1990s 
– authorized by the Northwest Forest Plan 
and the Secure Rural Schools and Commu-
nity Self-Determination Act (SRS) between 
2001 and 2018 have yet to deliver a perma-
nent or effective policy solution. The way 
that county payments are made, including the 
certainty of payments and the source of fund-
ing, is one of the most important and under-
appreciated policies affecting the fiscal and 
economic well-being of many public land 
counties and the way that public lands are 
I 
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managed. Existing programs have exacer-
bated fiscal dependence on uncertain and in-
equitable payments in many public lands 
counties, discouraged economic diversifica-
tion, and contributed to fiscal crises in the Pa-
cific Northwest counties historically most de-
pendent on payments.  
A long-term county payments solu-
tion must address two fundamental concerns: 
the economic challenges and opportunities 
for public lands counties in the 21st century 
economy, and the problems of uncertainty, 
inequitable distribution, and misdirected in-
centives generated by previous county pay-
ments policies and their implementation. 
This paper analyzes three policy options, in-
cluding a permanent return to a revenue shar-
ing model, a long-term reauthorization of 
SRS, and an endowment model that would 
create a new permanent natural resource trust 
at the federal level. These options are com-
pared according to total payment amount, 
payment equity (measured as the share of 
payments allocated to metropolitan vs. non-
metropolitan counties), predictability of pay-
ments, and the cost of appropriations over a 
35-year period. 
To provide context for the policy 
analysis, this paper begins with a description 
of the changing economic geography of the 
U.S. and the Pacific Northwest focused on 
implications for public land counties and lo-
cal government finance. Next, it reviews the 
history of county payment policies and how 
these programs exacerbate the challenges ru-
ral counties face in succeeding in the new 
economy. The paper then turns to the analysis 
of the three policy options and ends with a 
discussion of the endowment model and its 
potential to resolve the key challenges asso-
ciated with existing models of compensation 
																																																						
1 In this paper, the ‘West’ is defined as the 11 western states in the continental U.S.: Arizona, Colorado, California, 
Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.  
2 For details on services industries, see North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) definitions, availa-
ble here:  https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/metro-micro/about/omb-standards.html. 
 
by stabilizing and growing revenue over 
time, eliminating the need for cycles of con-
ditional appropriations, and providing flexi-
bility to address economic and forest man-
agement needs in public land counties. 
 
Changing Economic Geography of the Pa-
cific Northwest 
 
In the Pacific Northwest, a sharp decline in 
timber employment in the 1990s played out 
across a diverse and changing economic ge-
ography. To explain the nature of these 
changes and their implications, this section 
begins with a broader discussion of trends in 
the U.S. and the West’s economy, including 
a structural shift from goods-producing to 
service-providing jobs and increasing geo-
graphic inequality among counties. 
The West is the fastest-growing re-
gion of the U.S.1 and has added jobs and pop-
ulation at roughly twice the rate of the rest of 
the U.S. since 1970 (U.S. Department of 
Commerce 2017). Personal income growth 
among western counties also outpaced the 
rest of the nation. Most of the growth in new 
jobs (92 percent) and income are in a variety 
of services occupations, including high-wage 
earners such as doctors, lawyers, and ac-
countants, and low-wage earners such as re-
tail and restaurant workers (U.S. Department 
of Commerce 2017).2 The most important of 
the new services occupations are a set of 
high-wage jobs in ‘innovation’ sectors in-
cluding software, research and development, 
finance, and technology. These high-wage 
jobs function the same as a traditional mining 
or manufacturing job by exporting ideas and 
services to clients across the U.S. and the 
world while returning income to the county 
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where they are located, which in turn gener-
ates additional economic activity in other 
sectors (e.g. they have multipliers that create 
additional jobs in related sectors) (Moretti 
2012).  
At the same time, employment and in-
come in non-services sectors, including man-
ufacturing, natural resources, and agriculture, 
have declined as a share of total employment 
and income, and in some cases in absolute 
terms in the West since 1970. The ‘great de-
coupling’ describes the fact that mechaniza-
tion and productivity gains in the U.S. econ-
omy have not resulted in more middle-in-
come jobs or higher family incomes begin-
ning in the 1970s and accelerating since 
about 2000 (Brynjolfsson and Mcafee 2012). 
In manufacturing, for example, increases in 
productivity led to fewer, not more jobs – the 
U.S. manufacturing sector added more than 
$500 billion to Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) between 1980 and 2016 while eight 
million manufacturing jobs were lost. 
Productivity gains also led to employment 
losses in other sectors of the U.S. economy 
where jobs are more easily automated includ-
ing agriculture, timber, mining, and retail 
trade. Coal mining in the U.S., for example, 
lost 160,000 jobs between 1980 and 2010 as 
coal production increased 40 percent nation-
ally (U.S. Department of Labor 2017). In tim-
ber, consolidation and automation of timber 
mills and mechanization in timber harvesting 
increased labor productivity and weakened 
the link between the level of timber harvests 
and employment (Oregon Office of Eco-
nomic Analysis 2017).  
Another important trend is the in-
creasing importance of non-labor income. 
From 2000 to 2016, non-labor income in the 
United States grew by 55.4 percent compared 
to 23.3 percent growth in labor income. In the 
																																																						
3 The Pacific Northwest is defined as all counties in Washington, Oregon, and Idaho, and counties in Northern Cali-
fornia (Del Norte, Glenn, Humboldt, Lake, Mendocino, Shasta, Siskiyou, Tehama, and Trinity) and western Mon-
tana (Deer Lodge, Flathead, Granite, Lake, Lewis and Clark, Lincoln, Mineral, Missoula, Powell, Ravalli, Sanders, 
and Silver Bow). 
West, non-labor income from investment-re-
lated sources and age-related and hardship-
related transfer payments accounted for 52 
percent of net growth in real personal income 
during 2000-2016 and made up 37 percent of 
total personal income in 2016. The largest 
component of non-labor income is invest-
ment-related sources (dividends, interest, and 
rent) followed by age-related transfer pay-
ments (e.g. Social Security and Medicare) 
and hardship-related payments (e.g. Welfare 
and Medicaid) (Lawson, Rasker, and Gude 
2014). 
These structural shifts away from 
goods-producing to service-providing sectors 
are associated with increasing geographic in-
equality. Innovation jobs and other high-
wage services jobs tend to locate in cities 
around clusters of creative employees, com-
panies, and finance (Glaeser 2011; Moretti 
2012). Rural areas relatively remote from cit-
ies are not competing as well for these new 
services sector jobs due to relative isolation 
from markets (Goetz, Partridge, and Stephens 
2017; Rasker et al. 2009). At the same time, 
rural counties tend to be more acutely af-
fected by the challenges associated with 
productivity gains and trade that have re-
duced employment in natural resources sec-
tors and manufacturing (Hicks and Devaraj 
2015). 
The same geographic implications of 
restructuring are visible in the Pacific North-
west since 1990.3 The region covered by the 
Northwest Forest Plan lost 30,000 jobs in the 
timber industry in the 1990s. Despite these 
losses, 1.4 million new jobs were created in 
other sectors (primarily services) over the 
same period (Charnley 2006). The recent per-
formance of formerly timber-dependent 
counties, however, is mixed. Some rural 
counties are adding people, jobs, and income, 
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including those connected to cities and those 
attracting workers and retirees to remote, 
high-amenity landscapes (Chen and Weber 
2011; Goetz et al. 2017;	 Johnson and 
Cromartie 2006). Rural communities rela-
tively isolated from metropolitan markets 
have grown more slowly since 1990, how-
ever their performance, while poor relative to 
metropolitan counties, is similar to peer non-
metro counties that were not historically de-
pendent on timber (Rasker 2017). 
The uneven economic performance of 
formerly timber-dependent communities is 
explained in large part by the trajectory they 
were on in the late-1980s (Charnley et al. 
2006). Counties already beginning to diver-
sify and grow outside the timber industry be-
fore the Northwest Forest Plan was adopted 
in 1994 continued to grow despite the sharp 
decline in a major employment sector. Rural 
and relatively isolated communities experi-
enced the declines in timber harvest on fed-
eral land most acutely.  
Interventions included in the North-
west Forest Plan intended to stabilize and 
transition the economies of timber-dependent 
communities generally failed to overcome 
the structural and geographic context. In par-
ticular, efforts to stabilize timber supply, al-
beit at lower levels, were not met (volumes 
offered for sale averaged only 54 percent of 
target volumes) and overemphasized an out-
moded supply-side development model (Kil-
kenny and Partridge 2009) that ignored the 
effects of changes in the timber industry, in-
cluding mill consolidation, productivity 
gains, increasing trade, and reduced timber 
demand, responsible for two-thirds of job 
losses in timber in the Northwest Forest Plan 
region (Charnley et al. 2006).  
																																																						
4 County payments from the Forest Service also are distributed to local autonomous school districts. Schools in 
some states will be affected by changes in county payments policy and funding, but to a lesser extent than county 
governments due to state school equalization policy, particularly in Oregon and Washington. Gebert, Krista M., Da-
vid E. Calkin, and Ervin G. Schuster. 2004. “The Secure Rural Schools Act of 2000: Does It Make Rural Schools 
Secure?” Journal of Education Finance 30(2):176-186. 
Lessons from the Northwest Forest 
Plan reveal that timber counties were more 
complex and diverse than the stabilization 
model anticipated. In the new economy, a 
community’s assets – such as quality educa-
tion, health care services, and a high quality 
of life – play increasingly important roles in 
distinguishing rural places, even for remote 
and resource-dependent communities (Hal-
seth et al. 2006; Kashdan and Nothstine 
2014; Kitson, Martin, and Tyler 2004; 
Markey, Halseth, and Manson 2008; Power 
2006).  
The increasing importance of a com-
munity’s amenities, infrastructure, and ser-
vices to economic well-being places greater 
importance on the role county governments 
play in economic development activities. The 
next section provides more detail about the 
expanded and vital role of local governments 
in economic development and highlights the 
important role of fiscal policy related to nat-
ural resources, including county payments.4 
 
County Government Finance and County 
Payments 
 
Counties are the largest political subdivisions 
of states and have responsibility to provide 
basic public services, including public works 
such as roads and bridges and public safety. 
Another primary responsibility of county 
governments is administering state mandates, 
such as organizing elections, assessing prop-
erty, issuing licenses, and recording docu-
ments.  
 To discharge these roles and respon-
sibilities, counties have revenue-generating 
authority and receive grants and distributions 
from state and federal governments. Counties 
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in the Pacific Northwest generate revenue di-
rectly through property taxes, local sales 
taxes, and a variety of charges and fees. 
These sources of local revenue made up two-
thirds (66 percent) of all county government 
revenue in the Pacific Northwest in 2012 
(U.S. Census of Governments 2012). Inter-
governmental revenue, including county pay-
ments programs addressed in this paper, and 
other distributions and grants from state and 
federal governments, make up the remaining 
third of county government revenue. Region-
wide, county payments average three percent 
of total governmental revenue, but can be 
more important in some counties; county 
payments contributed a third or more of total 
governmental revenue in eight counties, a 
fifth or more in another 16 counties, and 10 
percent or more in another 22 counties (U.S. 
Census of Governments 2012; U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture 2017a; U.S. Department 
of Agriculture 2017b; U.S. Department of In-
terior 2017a; U.S. Department of Interior 
2017b). 
In the Pacific Northwest, county gov-
ernments play a key role in local and regional 
economic and community well-being. In ad-
dition to basic infrastructure and services, 
many counties provide community health and 
social services, environmental conservation, 
parks and trail infrastructure, libraries, and 
cultural services. Many counties also play an 
expanding role in economic development ac-
tivities including workforce development, 
business support, and marketing activities in 
response to changing demographics, funding, 
and economic pressures (Berman and Salant 
1996; Istrate 2014). Public-private partner-
ships and collaborations with the business 
community and nonprofits are emerging as 
key strategies to provide services critical to 
rural economic development (Agranoff and 
McGuire 2004; Sullivan, Ryser, and Halseth 
2014). The increasing role for county govern-
																																																						
5 O&C Lands refer to the Oregon and California Railroad Grant Lands. 
ments in economic development in the Pa-
cific Northwest and the significant contribu-
tions of county payments to many county 
budgets speaks to the importance of federal 
fiscal policy in public land counties. The next 
section reviews the history and status of the 
largest county payments programs in the Pa-
cific Northwest. 
 
History of County Payments 
 
County payment programs fall into three pe-
riods that correspond to major changes in the 
way payments are funded and distributed 
among counties. We use a version model to 
distinguish among these periods: ‘County 
Payments 1.0’ refers to the period between 
1908 and 1976 during which payments were 
established and funded exclusively from 
commercial receipts; 2.0 begins in 1976 with 
the addition of PILT; and 3.0 describes the 
period between 1990 and 2018 during which 
‘transition’ payments decoupled Forest Ser-
vice and Bureau of Land Management 
(BLM) O&C5 payments from commodity re-
ceipts and added economic diversification 
and collaboration as new goals for county 
payment programs. The transition payments 
of county payments 3.0 expire in 2019, re-
newing debate about the long-term viability 
and purpose of county payments programs. 
 
County Payments 1.0: Compensation Linked 
to Commodities, 1908-1976 
 
Gifford Pinchot, the first Chief Forester of 
the U.S. Forest Service, advocated for the in-
augural county payments program on the ra-
tionale that sharing the proceeds from the 
conservation and sustainable use of public 
lands provided for fair and sufficient pay-
ments in lieu of taxes that governments could 
collect were the lands privately held. These 
first payments were equal to 25 percent of the 
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proceeds from commercial activities on pub-
lic lands, mainly from timber sales; hence, 
the program became known as the ‘25 Per-
cent Fund’ (see Figure 1).6 Payments were re-
stricted to funding county roads and local 
school districts; state governments deter-
mined the allocation of payments between 
these uses. For the entire period between 
1908 and World War II, total payments aver-
aged $10 million annually.7 
During this period, the BLM began 
sharing commercial receipts generated on the 
O&C Lands with counties and schools.8 The 
O&C lands refer to BLM lands initially 
granted to the railroads as private land but 
subsequently revested to the federal govern-
ment and managed for timber harvests. Fifty 
percent of the proceeds of timber sales on 
																																																						
6 Act of May 23, 1908, Pub. L. No. 60-136. 
7 Unless noted otherwise, all values in this paper are adjusted for inflation to 2016 dollars. 
8 O&C Lands Act, Pub. L. No. 74-405, tit. II(a) (1937). The county government share of the O&C payments is not 
restricted to roads but can be used for any governmental purpose. 
9 Act of June 24, 1954 (68 Stat. 270). Payments are based on the “value of O&C lands assuming the same value for all 
lands as the average value of those lands that were assessed in 1915.” 
O&C lands accrue to county governments us-
ing a formula based on the relative taxable 
value of land in the counties in 1915.9 
After World War II, payments in-
creased substantially as timber extracted 
from public lands helped to fuel the nation’s 
housing boom. From 1945 to 1980, payments 
averaged $391 million, reaching a high of 
$1.2 billion in 1977 (U.S. Department of Ag-
riculture 2016). 
 
County Payments 2.0: PILT Addresses Eq-
uity, Uncertainty, and Incentives, 1976-1990 
 
As county payments increased in size after 
World War II, weaknesses in the revenue 
sharing model became more noticeable. In 
Figure 1. Key Developments and Reforms in County Payments, 1908-2016	
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1970, the Public Lands Law Review Com-
mission wrote: “Although they were origi-
nally designed to offset the tax immunity of 
Federal Lands, the existing revenue sharing 
programs do not meet a standard of equity 
and fair treatment either to state and local 
governments or to the Federal taxpayers” 
(1970:237). Payments proved to be too un-
predictable for local governments to use for 
effective annual budgeting, to engage in 
long-term planning, or to pay for costly infra-
structure improvements. On a national basis, 
payments could rise and fall on the order of 
30 percent annually (Hoover 2015) with indi-
vidual counties experiencing even more ex-
treme volatility. 
Payments based on the commercial 
values generated on public lands also were 
unequally distributed among counties. Coun-
ties in Oregon, the leading producer of public 
land timber, received more than a third of to-
tal revenue sharing payments while counties 
in states with relatively lower-value commer-
cial logging on public land received little 
compensation by comparison, leading the 
Public Lands Law Review Commission to 
write: “In some cases, payments made by 
Federal programs undercompensate, while in 
others they overcompensate.” The report 
added that payments based on commercial 
activities created perverse incentives for 
counties such that “pressures can be gener-
ated to institute programs that will produce 
revenue, though such programs might be in 
conflict with good conservation practices” 
(1970:237). 
These concerns eventually led Con-
gress to pass Payments in Lieu of Taxes 
(PILT) in 1976.10 PILT is a formula-driven 
payment based primarily on the number of 
acres of eligible ‘entitlement land’ in each 
county. The authorized payment based on 
acreage is reduced by ‘prior year payments’ 
																																																						
10 Pub. L. 94-565, 1976. 
11 The population ceiling payment is reduced for smaller-population counties. 
received from other county payment pro-
grams (including the Forest Service 25% 
Fund payments, but BLM O&C payments are 
exempt from the PILT formula) and is limited 
for all counties based on their population.11 
PILT is funded with appropriations from the 
U.S. Treasury (Corn 2008; Schuster 1995). In 
these ways, PILT is designed to work in con-
cert with revenue sharing payments to im-
prove the equity and stability of compensa-
tion for non-taxable federal lands. 
 
County Payments 3.0: Transition Payments 
Decoupled from Commodity Receipts, 1990-
2016 
 
Declining timber harvests after 1989 lowered 
revenue sharing payments to counties—by 
more than 90 percent in some Pacific North-
west counties (Hoover 2015). To stabilize an-
nual revenue sharing amounts, Congress be-
gan making ‘transition’ payments to counties 
where declining receipts create major reve-
nue shortfalls. The first transition payments 
were made in 1990 only to the BLM O&C 
counties in Oregon, but established a frame-
work that would be utilized later in larger 
programs extended to Forest Service public 
land counties as well. These first transition 
payments established a ‘floor’ payment based 
on the average revenue sharing payment 
amount during the five-year period 1986 to 
1990. The floor payment was paid from ap-
propriations between 1990 and 1993 (U.S. 
Department of Interior 2016). The Northwest 
Forest Plan extended transition payments to 
all BLM and Forest Service public land coun-
ties covered by the Plan. The so-called ‘spot-
ted owl’ transition payments separated timber 
harvests from county compensation by guar-
anteeing a minimum (floor) payment equal to 
85 percent of the five-year average payment 
during 1986 to 1990. As part of the planned 
transition, the value declined to 58 percent in 
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2003 after which the program was meant to 
expire (Tuchmann et al. 1996). 
In 2000, Congress passed the Secure 
Rural Schools and Community Self-Determi-
nation Act (SRS). SRS effectively extended 
transition payments nationally to address a 
similar decline in commercial receipts and 
revenue sharing payments from public 
lands.12 Initially authorized for six years, SRS 
provided optional payments equal to 85 per-
cent of the highest three years of revenue 
sharing payments between 1986 and 1999.13 
An important part of the negotiation 
over SRS was the desire on the part of some 
counties to maintain the link between public 
land management and county payments. The 
National Association of Counties lobbied 
successfully to allow counties to elect to re-
tain their revenue sharing payment under 
SRS (Hoover 2015). Inherent to this debate 
was a fundamental disagreement about the 
nature of the transition. Some timber-depend-
ent communities argued the transition was a 
period of adjustment that would eventually 
allow the land management agencies to re-
store timber harvests to previous levels with 
new environmental safeguards in place. As 
justification they pointed to the O&C Act that 
mandates these revested lands be used to sup-
ply a steady flow of timber to support local 
economies (Association of O&C Counties 
2018). 
Another view was that SRS intended 
to enable counties to move away from timber 
toward a more diverse economy. A more di-
verse economy would, in theory, generate 
new sources of governmental revenue that 
																																																						
12 Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-393. 
13 Under Section 102(a) and 103(a), states eligible to receive Forest Service and/or BLM revenue sharing payments 
can elect to receive either (1) the Twenty-Five Percent (Forest Service) or Fifty Percent (BLM) Payment or (2) the ‘full 
payment amount,’ calculated as the average of the three highest yearly revenue sharing payments from FY 1986 to FY 
1999. The SRS payment was tied to the average of the three highest historical payments to each state as a means of 
further reducing the volatility of timber receipts at the county level. Under the 2000 version of the SRS Act, funding 
for payments to states and counties is derived from revenues, fees, penalties, or miscellaneous receipts received by the 
federal government from activities of the Forest Service on National Forest land, and the Bureau of Land Management 
on revested and reconveyed grant lands (lands returned to federal ownership). Pub. L. No. 106-393, §§102(b)(3), 
103(b)(2). To the extent of any shortfall, payments are derived from Treasury funds not otherwise appropriated. 
would stabilize local government budgets 
and end the need for transition payments 
funded by Congress (Hoover 2015). To help 
accomplish a transition away from depend-
ence on timber, SRS increased funding from 
85 percent of historic payments to 100 per-
cent. The additional 15 percent was allocated 
between two new Titles in the SRS law. 
Funds allocated to Title II supported public 
land projects recommended to the land man-
agement agencies by Resource Advisory 
Councils (RACs). Title II funding opened the 
possibility for new collaborative efforts to 
address economic development goals on pub-
lic lands. Title III funds could be used on spe-
cial county projects including reimbursement 
for emergency services provided on federal 
lands and funding for community fire plans 
and Firewise activities.  
Reauthorization and reforms in 2008 
went further by altering the SRS funding for-
mula to include a per-capita personal income 
adjustment that directed relatively higher 
payments to counties with low per-capita per-
sonal income and provided a significant tem-
porary increase in funding. This new goal of 
economic equity in county payments had the 
effect of directing larger payments to non-
metropolitan counties with relatively poor 
economic performance. The increased fund-
ing level also returned payments close to his-
toric highs. (On a national level, only pay-
ments in the years 1977 to 1980 exceeded the 
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Status at the Time of Writing 
 
The expiration of SRS in FY 2018 effectively 
ends transition payments and returns to 
County Payments version 2.0 – that is, PILT 
and revenue sharing payments made under 
the Forest Service Act of 1908 and BLM 
O&C Act of 1937. It also creates an oppor-
tunity to advance a new approach. One option 
is to reauthorize SRS. Since the four year au-
thorization in 2008, SRS has been extended 
multiple times at one or two year intervals at 
declining amounts. The requirement to se-
cure authorization and appropriation on a re-
curring basis does not appear to be a long-
term solution. Another option is to revert to 
revenue sharing payments permanently. The 
President’s FY 2019 proposed budget would 
not reauthorize SRS and would limit appro-
priations for PILT. If the budget proposal is 
accepted by Congress, total payments to 
counties and schools in the Pacific Northwest 
will decline by half from $260 million in FY 
2015 to $131 million in FY 2019. The cuts 
would hit rural counties and schools hardest, 
with payments falling by greater than 80 per-
cent in several counties and metropolitan 
counties receiving a larger proportion of total 
payments – undoing the redistribution of pay-
ments from metropolitan to non-metropolitan 
counties achieved by SRS (Headwaters Eco-
nomics 2018).14 
 
Implications of Ending Transition Payments 
to Counties 
 
The expiration of transition payments has re-
newed the issues of equity, uncertainty, and 
incentives associated with revenue sharing 
payments. Changes in the regional economy 
and new taxation and expenditure limitations 
on local governments since transition pay-
ments began in 1990 add new urgency to re-
																																																						
14 Headwaters Economics estimates. To see a data visualization of the county-by-county change in payments, see 
https://headwaterseconomics.org/county-payments/policy-options/presidents-budget-cuts-county-payments/.  
solving these challenges. This section de-
scribes the ways in which the recent history 
of county payments has worked against ef-
forts to enhance county fiscal health, eco-
nomic development, and federal land man-
agement. 
Local decisions to utilize county pay-
ments to maintain low tax rates have led to 
reliance on federal payments to maintain an-
nual government budgets. For example, the 
Oregon counties that historically received the 
largest revenue sharing payments maintained 
among the lowest property tax rates and the 
lowest local revenue per capita of all counties 
in the state (Oregon Secretary of State 2016). 
State taxation and expenditure limita-
tions (TELs) have exacerbated reliance on 
county payments by making it more difficult 
to raise local tax revenue to replace declining 
county payments (Mullins and Wallin 2004; 
Stallmann et al. 2017). TELs typically restrict 
budget and tax levy increases to the rate of 
inflation with some provisions for new 
growth. For example, Oregon’s Measures 5 
and 50 passed in 1990 and 1997 limited prop-
erty tax rates, lowered property assessed val-
ues, and limited growth in assessed values 
(Oregon Department of Revenue 2009). Tax 
increases require voter approval at the local 
level. These limitations on local revenue au-
thority and capacity entrench a model of ane-
mic local taxation. Efforts to increase local 
tax levies have failed, resulting in fiscal stress 
and deep cuts to services (Johnson 2017). 
Other states have limited local revenue au-
thority in similar although typically less strin-
gent ways. Notably, Idaho limits growth in 
revenue received from property taxes to three 
percent annual growth without voter ap-
proval, with some allowances for new con-
struction and annexation (importantly, new 
industrial property is not exempt from the 
revenue limits) (Idaho State Tax Commission 
2017).  
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These local and state policies and 
practices entrench dependence on annual 
payments through PILT, SRS, and revenue 
sharing programs. Dependence on uncertain 
receipts and federal appropriations has fiscal 
and economic implications for counties.  
The National Association of Counties 
reports that the expiration of SRS and limits 
on PILT’s appropriation (as proposed by the 
Trump Administration) will require sharp 
budget cuts in many counties (Shuffield 
2017). Testimony from several county com-
missioners to a Senate Committee in May 
2017 illustrated the revenue and budget im-
pacts of declining county payments (U.S. 
Senate Committee on Energy and Natural 
Resources 2017). Cuts to critical services, in-
cluding education, public safety, road infra-
structure, and libraries, can have implications 
for rural communities because of the in-
creased importance of local government ser-
vices, partnerships, and initiatives for eco-
nomic development.  For example, Idaho and 
Clearwater counties in Idaho could lose more 
than half their federal payments, a decline of 
more than $7 million and $1.1 million, re-
spectively. The two counties together lost 
population between 2011 and 2015 (the latest 
year for which data are available) and have 
more than 500 fewer jobs in 2015 as com-
pared to 2007, before the start of the Great 
Recession. Declining enrollment at Clearwa-
ter County’s schools and reduced budgets 
jeopardize gifted and talented programs, 
shop, art, and music classes. The school dis-
trict is now on a four-day week and cannot 
support day-long kindergarten classes. Re-
taining and attracting families and businesses 
becomes increasingly difficult without robust 
community services and school programs 
(Haggerty 2017). 
Another implication of over-reliance on 
federal payments is to discourage economic 
development in other sectors outside of com-
mercial timber in public land counties. The 
Oregon Governor’s Task Force on Federal 
Forest Payments and County Services 
(2009:40) found that: 
 
In 1995, Alcan Cable, an industrial 
manufacturer, located in Douglas 
County. By 2008, the value of Alcan 
Cable’s plant and 200 new homes to 
house employees resulted in only 
$63,000 of county taxes for public ser-
vices. A typical Deputy Sheriff now 
costs Douglas County $75,320 per 
year, or 20 percent more than public 
revenues generated from this extensive 
development. Contrast that with a me-
dium-sized saw mill cutting 60 million 
board feet of timber per year purchased 
from federal O&C forests. At about 
$300 per thousand board feet, the cost 
to the mill of that timber was $18 mil-
lion. One-half of those revenues, or $9 
million, was shared with O&C coun-
ties as discretionary revenues. Of that 
$9 million, Douglas County received 
$2,254,500, over 35 times the property 
taxes generated by the Alcan plus-
homes development. 
 
This dynamic prompted Jackson County, Or-
egon Commissioner and Task Force member 
C.W. Smith to remark: “Most of these coun-
ties can’t build themselves or develop them-
selves into solvency. Every new resident is a 
negative on the budget” (Oregon Governor’s 
Task Force on Federal Forest Payments and 
County Services 2009:40). As a result, coun-
ties overemphasize activities that could in-
crease commercial receipts on federal public 
land and discount alternatives that generate 
less revenue but could diversify and grow 
economies. For example, concerns about lost 
revenue potential associated with assigning 
conservation to timber lands were the basis of 
opposition from the Association of O&C 
Counties to expanding the Cascade-Siskiyou 
National Monument (Cevagske 2017).  
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The uncertainty – and promise – of 
continued appropriations or of renewed tim-
ber receipts from increased harvest keeps 
some local officials focused on these solu-
tions instead of exploring alternatives 
(Mortensen 2012), a dynamic that mirrors the 
‘flickering’ of extractive industries, such as 
mines opening and closing with commodity 
cycles (Freudenberg 1992). Flickering can 
discourage communities from recognizing 
and accepting economic transition (Haggerty 
et al. 2018) and from making efforts to adapt 
to the changing economy. Rhetoric from 
members of Congress and the current Admin-
istration that promises to restore a sustained 
yield management regime to National Forest 
and the BLM O&C timber lands – including 
proposals to mandate annual harvest levels, 
increase the scale of categorical exclusions 
for timber projects, and limit judicial review 
of federal decisions, among other strategies – 
maintains the hope for some counties that 
changes to federal policy will resolve eco-
nomic and fiscal challenges at home.  
Increasing receipts on public lands 
may not be a viable long-term solution for a 
variety of reasons. The Forest Service 
stresses that generating receipts sufficient to 
meet the needs and expectations of counties 
year over year is unrealistic under variable 
market conditions and budget realities (Tid-
well 2014). The recent agreement in Con-
gress on a fire funding fix, forest manage-
ment reform, and a two-year extension of 
SRS as part of a major budget agreement left 
out the most aggressive efforts to increase the 
pace and scale of timber harvest, which may 
indicate that the land management agencies 
likely do not have the social license to in-
crease and sustain cuts at historic levels. 
Smaller efforts, including sharing a portion of 
receipts from stewardship contracts, would 
not increase payments materially. Steward-
ship receipts would add less than $6 million 
annually to revenue sharing payments (Rural 
Voices for Conservation Coalition 2017). 
More fundamentally, a reliance on sustained 
commercial timber harvests to fund county 
payments perpetuates the disconnect between 
the narrow fiscal goals of federal land man-
agement (maximize timber harvest) and the 
broader and changing economic values of 
public lands including the emerging restora-
tion economy (BenDor et al. 2015; Hibbard 
and Lurie 2013). 
These outcomes are consistent with a 
large body of academic literature focused on 
the challenges associated with translating re-
source wealth into long-run economic growth 
and community well-being. In short, access 
to resource endowments does not automati-
cally lead to economic prosperity or decline. 
Instead, policy choices, including fiscal poli-
cies, affect the long-term outcomes of re-
source extraction (Haggerty and Haggerty 
2015). Fiscal policies that invest revenue 
from resource extraction into long-term sav-
ings, community infrastructure, and eco-
nomic development activities in resource re-
gions can diversify economies and lead to a 
virtuous cycle of growth from the initial re-
source endowment (Gunton 2003). Alterna-
tively, fiscal policies that lead to an over-re-
liance on annual revenue from volatile re-
source sources, for example, by spending re-
source revenue on annual budgets and to 
maintain low taxes on other sectors of the 
economy, can discourage economic diversifi-
cation and lead to slower long-term growth – 
a resource curse (Morrison-Saunders et al. 
2016; Taylor, Hufford, and Bilbrey 2016). 
The experiences of counties in the Pa-
cific Northwest and lessons drawn from long-
term study of resource-dependent communi-
ties suggest what could be done to improve 
the way counties are compensated for non-
taxable federal land. Historic approaches that 
based compensation on volatile commercial 
receipts and uncertain discretionary appropri-
ations have undermined fiscal health in pub-
lic land counties, limited economic develop-
ment opportunities, and influenced forest 
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management decisions. During a Senate 
hearing in May 2017, Senator Murkowski (R-
AK) argued for an end to the “annual cycle of 
begging” for SRS and PILT appropriations, 
suggesting the possibility of a new path for 
county payments. She cited the importance of 
timber management reform for forest health 
and to sustain rural employment opportuni-
ties, but added that timber harvests alone are 
unlikely to provide a fiscal solution. For this, 
she recommended considering new ideas. 
The next section provides a policy analysis of 
three possible paths: revenue sharing, contin-
ued appropriations, and a hybrid approach 
that would use commercial receipts to build 
an endowment as the funding source for reau-
thorization of SRS. 
 
Analysis of County Payment Scenarios 
 
This section analyzes several policy options 
for Forest Service, BLM O&C, and PILT 
payments, including:  
 
• Option 1: Returning to a revenue 
sharing model and funding PILT at 
the full authorized payment amount. 
• Option 2: Returning to a revenue 
sharing model and limiting PILT 
funding to a level below the full au-
thorized payment amount. 
• Option 3: Implementing a long-term 
reauthorization of SRS and funding 
PILT at the full authorized payment 
amount.  
 
Without additional reform, these pol-
icy options would be funded annually with a 
combination of commercial receipts and dis-
cretionary appropriations. Alternatively, a 
new endowment model would create a per-
manent trust that would be funded with an-
nual commercial receipts. Distributions from 
the endowment would replace commercial 
receipts and appropriations to become the 
primary funding model for county payments 
over time.  
These policy options, including the 
endowment model, are analyzed on several 
metrics: total size of the payment to local 
governments, payment equity (measured as 
the share of payments distributed to metro-
politan and non-metropolitan counties), and 
the cost to the U.S. Treasury. The endowment 
model can be evaluated based on the size of 
the fund required to replace other funding 
sources, the time (in years) to build up an en-
dowment of sufficient size, and the total cost 





The President’s FY 2019 budget request 
(U.S. Office of Management and Budget 
2018) does not recommend reauthorizing 
SRS, meaning eligible public land counties 
will receive a revenue sharing payment from 
the Forest Service 25% Fund and a BLM 
O&C 50% Revenue Sharing payment. The 
budget proposal estimates that revenue shar-
ing payments for the two programs in FY 
2019 will be valued at $75 million, a decline 
from the actual FY 2017 revenue sharing 
payments of $78 million. Revenue sharing 
payments are made on a seven-year rolling 
average basis, attenuating annual change as-
sociated with increasing or declining com-
modity receipts. For this analysis, revenue 
sharing payments are estimated to average 




SRS expires again in FY 2019, but efforts to 
reauthorize the payments are expected to 
continue and include recommendations for a 
permanent authorization and mandatory 
funding. This paper assumes a permanent au-
thorization and annual appropriations fixed at 
the FY 2015 level for the analysis period.  
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PILT 
 
The President’s Budget requests a $397 mil-
lion appropriation for PILT in FY 2019, 
equal to the most recent ten-year average of 
PILT payments. The request is lower than the 
actual FY 2017 payment of $465 million, and 
lower than the authorized payment for FY 
2018 of $530 million. The higher FY 2018 
PILT payment reflects lower prior-year pay-
ments to counties for FY 2016. In that year, 
SRS was not paid and counties received only 
a revenue sharing payment.15 If PILT is 
funded below the authorized amount, appro-
priated payments are reduced proportionally 
for all eligible jurisdictions. 
The PILT formula is calculated under 
each of the policy options to estimate the total 
payment to counties and schools, payment 
equity, and the total cost of appropriations 




The Endowment Model option would create 
a new permanent trust funded with annual 
commercial receipts, including the Forest 
Service 25% Fund receipts and BLM O&C 
50% Revenue Sharing receipts. The principal 
balance of the permanent trust would be held 
in perpetuity and invested to earn income. At 
the end of each fiscal year, the permanent 
trust would make distributions that would 
benefit public land counties. Initially, distri-
butions from the permanent trust would be 
smaller than the value of commercial receipts 
deposited into the permanent trust. During 
this period, Congress would authorize appro-
priations to make up the difference between 
the value of distributions from the permanent 
trust and an authorized county payment level 
(e.g. the value of forgone revenue sharing 
payments or some other payment level). Dur-
ing this period, distributions from the perma-
nent trust would go first to the Treasury to 
offset the cost of appropriations.  
Congress also could make a one-time 
payment to capitalize the permanent trust. A 
capital payment would reduce the time before 
distributions from the trust grew to sufficient 
size to eliminate the need for continued an-
nual appropriations to fund county payments. 
 
Comparison of County Payment Options in 
the Pacific Northwest 
 
Tables 1 and 2 show that Option 2 (a 
return to a revenue sharing model and limited 
PILT funding) would result in the lowest total 
payments to Pacific Northwest counties 
($130 million), the least-equitable payments 
among metropolitan and non-metropolitan 
counties (metro counties would receive 37% 
of the total payment), and the lowest costs to 
the U.S. Treasury ($96 million annually). The 
change in the distribution of payments among 
metro and non-metro counties is the result of 
two factors. First, a return to revenue sharing 
payments ends the equity-based components 
of the SRS formula (including the per-capita 
personal income adjustment), increasing the 
inequity of payments overall. Second, lower 
prior-year payments from the Forest Service 
(BLM O&C payments are exempt from the 
PILT prior-year payment calculation) effec-
tively shift a larger share of the total PILT au-
thorization to metropolitan counties less af-








15 The last SRS payment authorized for FY 2015 was paid to counties during FY 2016. These payments are reported 
to the Department of Interior as prior-year payments for the PILT FY 2018 payment introducing a two-year lag be-
tween when Forest Service payments declined and when counties are eligible for a higher PILT payment. 
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Table 1. Average annual payments from selected county payments programs and cost of appro-
priations 






Total Payment Appropriation 
Cost 
Option 1: No SRS, 
Full PILT 
$131,016,000 $15,914,999 $18,180,795 $165,111,894 $131,016,000 
Option 2: No SRS, 
Limited PILT 
$96,443,367 $15,914,999 $18,180,795 $130,539,162 $96,443,367 
Option 3: SRS, 
Full PILT 
$90,871,329 $133,733,900 $35,556,001 $260,171,230 $226,075,436 
 
 
Table 2. Share of projected payments made to metropolitan and non-metropolitan counties16 






Metro Share of To-
tal Payment 
Non-Metro Share 
of Total Payment 
Option 1: No SRS, 
Full PILT 
$58,921,037 $106,190,857 36% 64% 
Option 2: NO SRS, 
Limited PILT 
$48,075,410 $82,463,751 37% 63% 
Option 3: SRS, Full 
PILT 
$71,333,217 $188,838,014 27% 73% 
 
 
Table 3. Endowment Model treasury cost and timing 
Endowment Options Size of Endowment Re-
quired 
Years to Build Endow-
ment w/Receipts 
Avg. Annual Treasury 
Cost Compared to 
Options 1 & 3 
Option 1 with Endow-
ment 
$852,394,855 20 $17,689.482 
Option 3 with Endow-
ment  
$4,232,497,536 68 -$33,307,223 
By comparison, reauthorizing SRS 
would provide relatively higher ($260 mil-
lion) and more equitable payments (metro 
counties would receive 27% of the total pay-
ment) relative to the revenue sharing options, 
but at higher cost to the U.S. Treasury ($226 
million annually). The cost of the SRS reau-
thorization is offset somewhat by a lower 
PILT authorization, but still increases the 
																																																						
16 Metropolitan and micropolitan statistical areas are geographic entities defined by the U.S. Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB). A metropolitan area contains a core urban area of 50,000 or more population. A micropolitan 
area contains an urban core of at least 10,000, but less than 50,000, population. All other areas are classified as rural. 
cost of appropriations by $95 million com-
pared to a revenue sharing model with PILT 
funded at the full authorized amount. 
Table 3 compares several options for 
how the Endowment Model could be pur-
sued. Column two is an estimate of how large 
the permanent trust balance would have to be 
for distributions to replace the appropriated 
funding level (in this case, equal to forgone 
revenue sharing payments or equal to the 
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value of an SRS reauthorization), or alterna-
tively the size of a capital payment that would 
eliminate the need for annual appropriations. 
Column three estimates the time required to 
build a permanent trust to the required size 
using only commercial receipts. Column 4 
compares the average annual cost of building 
the permanent trust with commercial receipts 
to the annual cost of SRS and PILT appropri-
ations over the same period.  
Compared to Options 1 and 3, the En-
dowment Model is more expensive in the 
short term (in the first 10 years), particularly 
if a large, one-time capitalization payment is 
made. However, over time the endowment 
model costs less (eventually eliminating the 
need for annual appropriations) and would 
increase county payments predictably year 
over year at no cost to the U.S. Treasury after 
the permanent trust reaches sufficient size. 
An endowment could replace revenue shar-
ing payments in 20 years at a cost of $350 
million. After 20 years, county payments 
would increase and PILT authorizations de-
crease annually. Replacing SRS appropria-
tions with distributions from a permanent 
trust would take 68 years, or could be done 
immediately with an initial payment into the 
endowment of $4.2 billion. Compared to a 
permanent authorization of SRS at FY 2015 
levels, the Endowment Model could cost $33 
million less each year on average as distribu-
tions from the permanent trust increase in 
amount and lower the annual cost of appro-
priations. After 68 years, payments to coun-
ties would increase and PILT authorizations 
decrease annually.  
The way distributions from the en-
dowment are allocated among counties – 
based on their relative contributions of com-
mercial receipts or based on the SRS formula, 
for example – also could resolve equity con-
cerns associated with annual revenue sharing 
payments.  
 
Discussion: Endowing Public Land Coun-
ties 
 
This analysis describes how a new option for 
county payments – an endowment model – 
could resolve the problems inherent to previ-
ous iterations of county payment policies and 
address the specific challenges and opportu-
nities associated with the changing economy 
and economic geography of the West. The 
endowment model idea is	based on the expe-
rience of U.S. states and many countries 
around the world in managing natural re-
source revenue and has several advantages 
over current county payment models. First, it 
still utilizes commercial receipts as the long-
term funding source for county payments, but 
stabilizes these revenues over time to guaran-
tee predictable and increasing payments year 
over year. Second, an endowment would not 
require discretionary appropriations from 
Congress after an initial period as the perma-
nent trust increases in value. Third, decou-
pling county payments from annual commer-
cial receipts would allow forest management 
reform to move forward without a revenue 
mandate, shifting the focus to management 
strategies intended to restore forest health 
and leverage economic development strate-
gies sensitive to the various needs of different 
types of public land counties. 
 
Permanent Trusts in States and Other Na-
tions 
 
Utilizing permanent trusts to stabilize reve-
nue and build an endowment from the extrac-
tion of natural resources is not a new idea. 
Trusts are utilized by nearly every U.S. state 
with significant natural resource wealth. For 
example, Alaska, Louisiana, New Mexico, 
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, and Wyo-
ming have state land and severance taxes 
trust funds with a combined value of more 
than $100 billion (Alaska Permanent Fund 
Corporation 2009; Williams 2008; Wyoming 
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Taxpayers Association 2015). Trusts also are 
common internationally, led by Norway’s 
massive sovereign wealth fund created from 
oil revenue and valued at more than $950 bil-
lion (Johnson 2007). 
The most relevant models for a fed-
eral public land endowment are the numerous 
state trusts funded with royalties and fees 
generated from commercial activities on 
state-owned land, including timber harvests. 
Beginning in 1803 with Ohio’s statehood, the 
federal government transferred to new states 
a portion of the public domain not yet 
claimed by homesteaders, granted to rail-
roads, or reserved for other purposes (Souder 
and Fairfax 1996). In most western states, the 
federal government transferred two sections 
in each township. The lands were intended to 
generate revenue for local schools and other 
purposes. Initially, states often sold lands and 
spent the proceeds of sales as they came in. 
The unsustainability of this practice soon led 
states to hold “trust lands” in perpetuity and 
to establish permanent trust funds that would 
receive the proceeds from the management of 
trust lands. The principal balance of these 
funds is invested to earn income, effectively 
replacing an exhaustible resource endow-
ment with a perpetual financial endowment 
that funds public schools and other state in-
stitutions. 
Norway’s experience also offers a 
useful example. Oil production began in Nor-
way’s North Sea waters in 1971. Price spikes 
in oil in 1979 and 1980 generated significant 
revenue to the government, and the govern-
ment spent that money on an annual basis. 
Norway’s economy grew rapidly with rising 
wages, spending, and borrowing in the public 
and private sector. When prices subsequently 
collapsed in 1986, the economy’s depend-
ence on annual oil revenue quickly precipi-
tated a fiscal crisis. In 1990, while the coun-
try was still suffering high unemployment 
and persistent cuts in government spending, 
Norway established its permanent trust as a 
forward-looking fiscal tool that would help 
the country do better if and when the oil price 
rose again. The trust was designed to buffer 
the economy from the annual uncertainty in 
oil revenue and build a lasting endowment 
from oil wealth to benefit future generations. 
The fund was set up in 1990 but no money 
was available to invest into the fund until 
1996 when oil prices began to recover. To-
day, Norway’s trust fund is worth about $900 
billion (Rosalsky 2014). 
The U.S. has one example of a perma-
nent trust at the federal level that benefits 
public land counties. The U.S. Endowment 
for Forestry and Communities was estab-
lished as part of the Softwood Lumber Agree-
ment between Canada and the U.S. in 2006. 
The agreement established the Endowment 
with $200 million; proceeds from the Endow-
ment are used to fund educational and chari-
table activities in public land communities in 
the U.S. (Owen 2016). 
If a new endowment is established to 
fund county payments, best management 
practices can be gleaned from these exam-
ples. For example, to guard against raiding, 
Congress could authorize an independent en-
tity to establish and manage the Trust as it did 
when it created the U.S. Endowment for For-
estry and Communities. Congress can also 
mandate best practices already utilized else-
where – for example, asset management strat-
egies that are in accordance with the Prudent 
Expert Rule (Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974), inflation-proofing the 
trust (Rodell 2018), and oversight by the In-
spectors General of the U.S. Departments of 
Agriculture and Interior. 
 
Missed Opportunity for County Payments 
 
The total value of timber harvests from all 
Forest Service land since 1908 is about $80 
billion (in 2016 dollars) (U.S. Department of 
Agriculture 2016). Had Congress followed 
the example of the states and established an 
HJSR ISSUE 40 (2018)   
endowment in 1908 instead of annual reve-
nue sharing payments, it would distribute 
$3.2 billion today to counties and schools, 
three times larger than the maximum revenue 
sharing payment made in 1977 and 213 times 
larger than actual payments made in FY 2017 
(Headwaters Economics 2014). Had Con-
gress established an endowment in 1977 in-
stead of PILT, it would be worth $12.3 billion 
today and distribute payments equal to $308 
million. Had Congress established an endow-
ment in 2000 instead of SRS, it would be 
worth $1.3 billion today and distribute $33 
million. 
Commercial receipts from federal 
lands remain at relatively low levels. Estab-
lishing a permanent trust today only with 
funding from commercial receipts would take 
time to build a significant endowment (68 
years to replace SRS). With Congress consid-
ering forest management reform and new 
uses – and revenue streams – on public land, 
establishing an endowment today creates the 
framework to capture future receipts if they 





The way that county payments are made, in-
cluding the certainty of payments and the 
source of funding, is one of the most im-
portant and under-appreciated policies affect-
ing the fiscal and economic well-being of 
many public land counties and how public 
lands are managed. The current models – rev-
enue-sharing payments and discretionary ap-
propriations from Congress – have failed to 
provide predictable and fair compensation to 
counties. This failure has exacerbated fiscal 
crises in rural communities and left them un-
prepared to meet the economic challenges 
and opportunities for public lands counties in 
the 21st century economy. Remaking the fis-
cal relationship between public lands and 
public land counties by establishing and 
funding a permanent trust would stabilize and 
grow revenue over time, eliminate the need 
for annual Congressional appropriations, and 
provide flexibility to address economic and 
forest management solutions appropriate to 
the needs of diverse public land counties in 
the Pacific Northwest. The endowment 
model also could begin to articulate an inte-
grated public lands policy that better aligns 
land management, economic development, 
and county payments to benefit Pacific 
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